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Current food practices affect humans, animals, and the environment in ways that some 
regard as morally troubling. In this entry, I will explain the most important of these 
worries and what has been said in response to them. I will conclude with a brief 
discussion of one of the most interesting recent topics in food ethics, lab-grown meat, 




A common criticism of our current food practices is that they harm animals (see 
VEGETARIANISM AND VEGANISM). How might they do so? The most common 
suggestion is that they do so in virtue of the conditions in which animals are kept and 
killed in factory farms (Singer 1975). These conditions are often cramped and almost 
exclusively indoors. The animals are often force-fed, with poor-quality, tasteless feed. 
They are variously injected with hormones, debeaked, dehorned, castrated, artificially 
inseminated, and so on. Many of them are killed without anaesthesia. Male chicks, for 
whom there is no profitable purpose, are disposed of (usually by being ground up in 
machinery). Not only are these treatments often painful, they prevent these animals 
from experiencing many of the pleasures they are capable of. Moreover, they interfere 
with the natural functioning of these animals, preventing from them exercising or 
realising their distinctive natures (see WELL-BEING; EUDAIMONISM.) 
 
Are animals harmed also in free-range or humane animal farming, which reduce these 
painful treatments and provide animals with green space to roam in, better quality 
feed, and more contact with each? Some have pointed out that even the best of these 
farms still kill these animals prematurely, shortening their lives and so depriving them 
of pleasant experiences or functioning that they might otherwise have had (Bradley 
2015). Others deny that animals can be benefited by extra years, since they cannot 
have future-directed desires (Belshaw 2015; Velleman 1993). (See ANIMAL 
COGNITION; ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS OF.) 
 
Some have claimed that animal farming is actually good for the animals in question, 
since without it, these animals would have no lives at all (Stephen 1896). Against this, 
it is often said that many of these animals have lives that are worse than no life at all. 
Others have objected that existence cannot be better for one than non-existence, since 
the non-existent have no level of well-being to draw a comparison with (see 
POPULATION). This last claim raises a problem for animal advocates. If animals 
cannot be benefited by being conceived and raised for us to eat, then how can they be 
harmed by such processes? In response, it has been suggested that what is harmful for 
such animals is not being conceived, but the ways they are treated after conception 
(Bramble 2015). 
  
For some philosophers, the moral problem with animal farming lies not (or not only) 
in its harming animals, but in its wronging them in some (other) way—say, by 
exploiting or disrespecting them, or by breaching rights that they have (see ANIMAL 
RIGHTS; CONTRACTUALISM; EXPLOITATION). 
 
Suppose that animal farming harms or wrongs animals. Might it nonetheless be 
morally acceptable? According to some, these harms or wrongs might be outweighed 
by the benefits to humans of eating meat. How does eating meat benefit humans? 
Some point to nutritional benefits. However, the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics 
concludes that “appropriately planned vegetarian, including vegan, diets are healthful, 
nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention and 
treatment of certain diseases. These diets are appropriate for all stages of the life 
cycle, including pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, adolescence, older 
adulthood, and for athletes” (Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics 2016). Others have 
argued that the pleasures of meat are greatly enriching for humans (Lomasky 2013). 
Others still have noted the value of carrying on family, cultural, or religious traditions, 
many of which centrally involve the consumption of animal products. There would be 
huge costs here, they say, in severing these links with the past. Another possible 
response is one framed not in terms of benefits to humans, but in terms of rights we 
humans have to, for example, carry on our cultural traditions. 
 
If animal farming is morally problematic, what follows about our obligations as 
consumers? One obvious suggestion is that we should refrain from eating meat. 
However, a number of philosophers have claimed that this does not follow, since we 
are powerlessness as individuals to affect the conditions of animals on farms, or the 
numbers of animals raised to be killed, through our individual purchasing decisions. 
On no occasion when you buy a burger will your decision to do so make life worse for 
any animal. Food production is simply insensitive to such small differences in 
demand. (See TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS.) These considerations suggest that it 
might actually be morally worse to buy from small free-range farms, since only these 
are small enough for one’s purchasing decisions to have a meaningful impact on 
demand. Others have objected that, while it is very unlikely, of any given purchase of 
factory-farmed meat, that this purchase will worsen the lives of animals, there is a 
small chance it will be the purchase that prompts a retailer to order a lot more meat, 
and so a small chance that it will make a very great difference (Kagan 2011). A final 
possible response is that it isn’t necessary, for our individual meat purchases to be 
morally wrong, that they make a difference. It is enough that we act with a certain 
intention, or that we are participating in a larger practice that is morally wrong (see 





Current food practices, many have claimed, are harmful to humans. Many animal 
products, for example, are high in cholesterol and saturated fat, and reliance on them 
has been linked with heart disease and other injurious conditions. Overconsumption of 
animal products is also a major cause of obesity, one of the central health crises of 
many Western countries (Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics 2016). It is not only the 
consumption of animal products that might be harmful here. Excessive sugars and fats 
elsewhere in our diets appears to be responsible for much illness and disease in 
contemporary society. There are also worries about chemicals in our foods (including 
pesticides, additives, and contaminants), as well as genetically modified foods (that is, 
foods derived from organisms whose DNA has been modified in a way that does not 
occur naturally—for example, through the introduction of a gene from a different 
organism), whose full effects on our health are not currently known (see 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS). 
 
It might be suggested that the issue here is not a moral one, but a prudential one. If 
eating these foods harms one’s health, this provides one with a self-interested reason 
to refrain from them, but one isn’t morally required to refrain. However, these harms 
do appear to raise moral issues. These relate to the responsibilities of food producers 
and retailers, and also of governments. If one’s products harm people, does one have 
responsibilities to inform the public of the risks involved? What sort of information is 
required? Should one discontinue these products altogether? As for governments, to 
what extent should they regulate industries that produce or sell harmful foods? On a 
conservative view, governments should require companies to be upfront about the 
risks their foods pose to the public. Governments might also be required to better 
inform the public about various risks involved. On a more demanding view, 
governments should ban certain fatty or sugary foods, or at least significantly restrict 
access to them, in the same way that certain drugs or poisons are regulated. 
 
Many, however, consider these proposals paternalistic (see PATERNALISM). It is the 
individual’s own responsibility, they say, to seek out relevant information about foods 
on offer. Certainly, the government should not be banning foods or interfering with 
advertising. This paternalism worry, it is worth noting, has markedly less force in 
countries with free health care, since individuals with unhealthy diets often end up 
needing medical treatment, which is paid for by the taxpayer. 
 
An alternative to governments banning unhealthy foods, or restricting our access to 
them, is for them to subsidise healthy food industries, or at least improve consumers’ 
access to healthy foods (Sunstein 2014; Conly 2018). If healthcare and education 
should be free and available to all, why not also good quality fruit and vegetables? 
Quite aside from the ethical reasons to engage in this, there are powerful economic 
reasons to do so. A healthy population is a more productive one. 
 
Current food practices, it is claimed, not only harm consumers, but also workers in 
certain sectors of the food industry. Slaughterhouse work, for example, has been 
linked to mental illness, PTSD, and drug and alcohol abuse (Pachirat 2011). This 
again raises the question of the responsibilities of food corporations and governments. 
If such work can be so harmful, should people be allowed to do it? If we support 
health and safety regulations for workplaces at all, how can we consistently permit 
people to work in an industry that is so injurious to their health? Such claims are again 
sometimes labelled paternalistic. But is such work ever freely or autonomously 
chosen, or only taken up as a result of unacceptable economic or social pressures? An 
added complication is that much of the hardest and most unpleasant work done in the 
food industry—especially farm work—is performed by new migrants or “guest 
workers”, and is often very poorly compensated. Is this fair or just (see WORK, 
ETHICS OF)? 
 
There is an additional international dimension here. Much food consumed in wealthy 
Western countries is produced by people in poorer countries for very little money or 
in bad working conditions (see WORLD HUNGER; GLOBAL POVERTY; AID, 
ETHICS OF). Some argue that this is morally acceptable, given the even worse 
alternatives for these foreign workers. But others claim that the alternatives are worse 
only if Western governments allow them to be. It is within our power to lobby foreign 
governments to ensure their workers are paid a fair income, or that working conditions 
are improved.  
 
One proposed corrective for some of these problems is food sovereignty—a shift away 
from corporate, profit-driven control of the food system toward a more democratic 
system, where local populations own and control their own food systems (see FAIR 
TRADE; GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE). A key question concerns whether 
such sovereignty is valuable merely as a means to better conditions, or has some kind 
of intrinsic value itself. Some have suggested that it would have no value at all in 
circumstances where it would result only in, say, famine for local populations. 
 
In light of the apparent harmfulness of certain food industries on both consumers and 
workers, what are our obligations as individual consumers? Even if some individual 
(say, Sally) does not buy unhealthy food in quantities large enough to harm her, is it 
morally wrong for her to buy any such food, given the financial support this lends to 
corporations that produce such food, not to mention the impact Sally’s participation in 




Current food practices, it has been claimed, are imperiling the natural environment 
(see AGRICULTURAL ETHICS). Fertilizers and pesticides are damaging soil and 
water. Losses in crop biodiversity risk new waves of pests and diseases that might 
devastate global harvests. Massive amounts of land and water are used to grow the 
grain that feeds livestock. Certain fish populations are collapsing, threatening 
irreversible changes to oceans and ecosystems (for discussion, see Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 2018). Methane emissions from cattle 
are one of the leading causes of climate change (see CLIMATE CHANGE).  
 
Some philosophers believe that damage of this kind to the natural environment is bad 
in itself (see ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS; WILDERNESS, VALUE OF; 
ANTHROPOCENTRISM; DEEP ECOLOGY; CONSERVATION BIOLOGY). 
Ecosystems and species, they argue, have intrinsic value. Others emphasise instead 
the possible harms here for humans and animals. Many note that the worst of these 
harms is likely to befall, not contemporary beings, but those who will exist in the 
future. If this is so, we need to consider our obligations to future beings (see 
INTERGENERATIONAL ETHICS). An important complication here is that action 
we take now for the sake of future beings (say, cutting down on our meat consumption 
in order to halt or reverse climate change) might be self-defeating, for it will change 
our daily lives in ways that affect the times at which we conceive our children, 
thereby altering the identities of future people. Such action, then, might not benefit 





One of the most interesting recent topics in food ethics is lab-grown meat—i.e., meat 
cultured in a lab from biopsied cells. The production of such meat needn’t harm any 
animals (aside, perhaps, from the few animals whose cells are biopsied); it can be 
engineered to be healthier than meat grown from whole animals; and it is likely to be 
able to be produced with far less impact on the environment, since it will not require 
the sort of vast agriculture mentioned above. Consequently, if lab-grown meat is 
widely adopted, it might allow us to sidestep many of the moral problems raised by 
current food practices. According to many leading ethicists, the lab-grown meat 
programme “gets the ethical two thumbs up” (Savulesu and Schaefer 2013). 
 
But are there any downsides to lab-grown meat? Some consumers find the idea of it 
unnatural and for this reason repulsive. Others, on the opposite side of the spectrum, 
are concerned that it will perpetuate a place in our society for meat, when we should 
be using new technologies to step away from this part of our past. 
 
One moral worry concerning lab-grown meat has to do with the reasons for which we 
are likely to take it up (Bramble 2017). If lab-grown meat is widely taken up, it is 
likely to be mostly for self-interested reasons—i.e., because it is cheaper, tastier, and 
healthier than regular meat. Ethical reasons, in other words, will not be a big factor in 
our choice. What is the upshot of this? That the morally troubling traits in us that led 
us to take no action on factory farming will be, not addressed by us, but preserved or 
entrenched in us. Why is this concerning? Because such traits—for example, self-
centredness, a foolish deference to those who are culturally in charge, a preparedness 
to silence or turn away from qualms one might have, and so on—might lead us to 
ignore the urgent needs of other beings further down the track, or even fail to support 




Here, we have looked at the core questions of food ethics. But there are many other 
fascinating questions falling within food ethics. Is it okay to feed your pet meat? Is it 
okay (or even required) to raise your children as vegetarian? Should we intervene in 
nature to prevent carnivorous species preying on other species for food, if we could do 
so without disrupting ecosystems (McMahan 2016)? 
 
 
See also: AID, ETHICS OF; AGRICULTURAL ETHICS; ANIMAL COGNITION; 
ANIMAL RIGHTS; ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS OF; ANTHROPOCENTRISM; 
CLIMATE CHANGE; COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY; COMPLICITY; 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY; DEEP ECOLOGY; ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS; 
EUDAIMONISM; FAIR TRADE; GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS; 
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE; GLOBAL POVERTY; 
INTERGENERATIONAL ETHICS; NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM; 
PATERNALISM; POPULATION; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS; 
VEGETARIANISM AND VEGANISM; VIRTUE ETHICS; WILDERNESS, 
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